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Working for India or against Islam? 
Islamophobia in Indian American
Lobbies 
Ingrid Therwath
1 An increasing number of articles on the Indian lobby in Washington have been published
in the past 15 years, by the Indian, the American and the Pakistani press. This period
coincides  with  two  major  events,  one  at  the  domestic  level  and  the  other  at  the
international level. According to the 1990 US Census, 857,000 Indian Americans resided in
the Unites States, more than twice the number a decade before (they were 350,000 in
1980). They were the fifth ethnic community in the US and were already established in
the country. Besides, the end of the Cold War and that of a bipolar vision of international
relations coincided with the rise of transnational groups and ethnic lobbies as political
actors (Ambrosio 2002).1 The Indian lobby developed itself in this context, while India at
the same time was witnessing the rise of Hindu nationalism. Now, with the post 9/11
American emphasis on the axis of evil and on the dangers of Islam, it seems the Indian
lobby is  using Islamophobia as a political  strategy.  Hence the question:  is  the Indian
American lobby in Washington working for India or against Islam? 
2 Of  course,  this  question  is  deliberately  provocative  as  it  could  be  argued  that  both
positions, pro-India activism and Islamophobia, can be reconciled. Further on the other
end Indian American lobbyists claim to focus only on their community in the US and on
domestic issues, far from any imported communal agenda. However, fieldwork conducted
in New York and in Washington in July and August 2004 revealed virulent streaks of
Islamophobia  and  hostility  towards  Pakistan  amongst  professional  Indian  American
lobbyists.  While  not  absolutely  systematic,  this  anti-Muslim  sentiment  has  been
prominent  in  most  of  the  interviews  that  I  conducted.  Constituting  a  population  of
slightly  more than 1  million Hindus (approximately  52.6% of  the total  population of
Indian Americans),  the 2000 U.S.  Census show that Hindus outnumber Muslims here,
although their numerical superiority is not as overwhelming as it is in India. One would
therefore expect this repartition to be mirrored in the membership of Indian American
Working for India or against Islam? Islamophobia in Indian American Lobbies
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 1 | 2007
1
lobbies, but none of these pressure groups claiming to work for a multicultural homeland
in a multicultural environment had Muslim representatives. The fact that South Asian
Muslim minorities are said to identify more with coreligionists than with people hailing
from the same region of the world further emphasizes a largely anti-Muslim trend among
Indian American lobbies. The post-9/11 environment in the US also seems to encourage
this  antagonism,  but  on  the  contrary,  the  Indo-Pakistani  peace  process,  with  its
Confidence-Building Measures and ‘hands of friendship’, goes against this rhetoric. The
hostility  of  the  Indian American lobbies  towards  Islam and Pakistan can actually  be
construed as the result of two separate but complementary processes: the space occupied
by ethno-religious minorities in American politics on the one hand, and long-distance
nationalism on the other hand. In short, Islamophobia in Indian American lobbies stems
from a combination of both contingent and structural factors as well as external and
internal causes. 
 
The American factors
3 By no means does globalization negate the local dimension of modern life and a new
word, ‘glocalization’, has even been coined to highlight the mingling of the global and the
local (Robertson 1992: 173). The same concern over local factors should also be at the core
of  any  reflection  on  transnational  communities.  I  shall  therefore  try  to  root  the
Islamophobia I encountered in the Indian American lobby to the American context itself.
 
Indian Americans: Divided we stand?
4 Today, 1,9 million Indian Americans live in the United States.  The latest Census data
convey a very positive image of a prosperous, young, urban and educated community
with an average income higher than that of the national average (Reeves & Bennett 2004).
2 Hence Indian Americans are often presented as a ‘model minority’, a conservative myth
opposed by scholars like Daniel Sabbagh, or community activists like Christopher Dumm
of the Indian American Center for Political Awareness (IACPA) (Sabbagh 2003, Dumm &
Jain 2004: 7). However, in spite of residual problems of poverty in the Indian American
population, it had long been ‘a minority in making’, ‘seen, rich, but unheard’ and ‘a silent
Asian minority’, to borrow titles of scholarly work written in the late 1980s and in the
1990s (Babu 1989, Khagram et al. 2001, Gosine 1990, Segal 1999). Of course, a variety of
Indian  American  associations  based  on  occupation,  language,  or  religion  exists.  The
website www.garamchai.com, designed as an Indian American portal, listed 333 of them
spread throughout the American territory, but none of the associations mentioned are
overtly political.3 Many explanations have been sought to account for this lack of political
visibility: Indian Americans were either more concerned by the accumulation of capital or
too divided along religious, caste, linguistic or regional lines. But, although particularly
segmented,  the Indian American community  had not  always  stayed clear  of  political
involvement. 
5 At the beginning of  the twentieth century Indians in the U.S.  got  organized for two
causes:  the  independence  of  India  and  the  suppression  of  racial  discrimination  in
America. The pro-independence Ghadar party was formed in San Francisco in 1913, while
individual Indians were taking legal action to be considered as Caucasians and claimed
thus the American citizenship from 1910 onwards with the United States vs the Bulsara
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ruling in 1910 and later the Thind case in 1923. Others contested propriety laws excluding
non-whites from land-ownership. The expulsion by American authorities of 375 Indians
on the Japanese ship Komagatu Maru in 1914 gave an additional incentive for political
mobilization to the Indian population in the U.S. Finally, India gained independence in
1947 and the McCarran-Walter Act (Immigration and Naturalization Act) put an end to
institutionalized discrimination in 1952. Four years later, the India-born American citizen
Dilip Singh Saund became a member of Congress as a representative for the State of
California. In the subsequent years and especially after the 1965 immigration wave from
India, the number of Indians residing in the US rose significantly. However, despite the
growing diversity of Indian associations in the U.S., political lobbying was almost non-
existent till the 1970s-1980s, when the Indian government started to instrumentalize its
U.S.-based diaspora more aggressively and to hire private lobbyists to air its views in
Washington (Guthikonda et al. 1979: 198).4 
6 There are now several Indian American organizations involved in lobbying, either at the
local community level,  or at the national level or to influence foreign policy like the
Association  of  Indians  in  America  (AIA,  founded  in  the  mid-1960s),  the  National
Federation of Indian Associations (NFIA, founded in 1971 under a different name), the
National  Association  of  Americans  of  Asian  Indian  Descent  (NAAAID),  the  Indian
American Forum for Political Education (IAFPE, also called the Forum), and the Indian
American  Center for  Political  Awareness  (IACPA,  1993).  Two  major  professional
associations,  the American Association of Physicians of Indian Origins (AAPI) and the
Asian American Hotel  Owners  Association (AAHOA),  also  devote  considerable  energy,
time and financial resources to political lobbying. The latest addition in this mosaic of
pressure groups is the US-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC, created in 2001).
For the media as well as for lobbyists belonging to other communities, USINPAC has now
become  the  most  important  organization  in  terms  of  membership  size  (the  paid
membership  amounts  to  13,500  persons  while  another  27,000  are  non-paying  active
members) and access to power centres (with gala events at the Capitol Hill  and joint
conferences with other influential groups). It even heralds itself as ‘the first and only
Indian  American  political  action  committee  registered  with  the  Federal  Election
Commission’5 and  wished  to  project  itself  as  the  legitimate  representative  of  Indian
interests in the U.S., as the uncontested voice of a unified community. This, however,
could not be further away from the truth.
7 The division of the Indian American community has become almost proverbial over the
years. During a visit to the U.S. as Prime minister of India in 2001, Atal Bihari Vajpayee
has fustigated the lack of unity in the community and had deplored the fragmentation of
associations whose primary goals seemed to have more to do with personal promotion
than social work or political lobbying. Professional activists working directly with the
India lobby also draw a sorry picture of the constant internal strife. For instance, a young
32-year-old Indian Jewish migrant working for the American Jewish Committee (AJC), one
of the most powerful ethnic lobbies in the U.S., is very harsh toward Indian Americans.
This deeply patriotic senior fellow in charge of international affairs and Indian-Jewish
American relations is extremely critical and says that ‘Indians suck you. You should never
work for Indian Americans because they exploit you. They are very individualistic and
very poor as a community. There is little close cooperation. Where there is success, there
is ego and this is a problem’.6 Fieldwork conducted in New York and Washington reveals
two main sources of division among Indian American lobbyists: personal conflicts and
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generational conflicts. Most of the times, the interviewees have devoted the first half an
hour of our discussion to condemn other lobbyists and their organization. USINPAC in
particular  was  heavily  criticized.  It  is  only  after  these  introductory  words  of  advice
against colleagues and competitors that they started to describe their own work. The
legislative affairs counsel of USINPAC, a professional lobbyist in her mid-fifties, illustrates
the personal conflicts pervading throughout the community organizations and goes as far
as evoking a conspiracy theory to explain the criticism faced by USINPAC amongst Indian
Americans. According to her, a few of her fellow Indian American lobbyists condemn her
work because she was given preference over them in 1993 when Congressman Brown
gathered a delegation to visit India. She recalls that: 
It’s like the ‘usual suspects’. I met all of them on this trip, all the ‘suspects’ and they
come back years later to haunt you. I’m speaking about 20 people, who come from
the  business  community—actually  from  the  IT  and  technology  business  and  no
other business—and doctors. They were present during White House events hosted
by Hilary Clinton. Now the doctors have gone Republican but not the others. All of
them are now heading Indian American associations like IAFPA, NFIA, AIFIA. These
organizations were created in the late 1970s-early 1980s as social clubs. Later they
took on some political activity. These people have a clout among their own circle
because  they know some Congressmen.  It  is  an issue  of  prestige.  They donated
money just to get pictures, to get the photo-op to increase their business and rise in
the  Indian  American  community.  They  don’t  have  anything  to  ask  from  the
politicians, they only claim clout for themselves. So when they look at USINPAC,
there is a curiosity and jealousy factor. They can’t or don’t want to connect the
money with the issue. It’s just personal promotion.7
8 The second divisive factor is  age,  now that two generations of  Indian Americans are
professionally and politically active. Significantly, virulent critics of USINPAC include the
39-year-old President of the Indian American Leadership Initiative (IALI), the 29-year-old
Executive Director of the Indian American Center for Political Awareness (IACPA) and the
29-year-old founding President of the now defunct South Asians for Kerry (SAKI). They
have repeatedly pointed out the generation gap between themselves, born and raised in
America, and the ‘uncle and aunties [who] don’t believe in this South Asian thing’8 and
who  cannot  see  beyond  the  India-Pakistan  and  Hindu-Muslim  communal  conflicts.
Although the younger generation is now entering the political arena, as Bobby Jindal’s
2004 election to the Congress has revealed, the older Indian Americans are still leading
forefront organizations like USINPAC and claim to represent the community as a whole.
The older generation of activists seems more influenced by subcontinental conflicts while
the younger ones see the advantage of pan-Asianism or at least of South Asian unity and
tend to form South Asian organizations in order to address a wider audience. When asked
about the founding of SAKI, its President remembered the opposition she encountered in
the first generation of immigrants because of ‘a generational gap’. According to her, ‘the
Indian community was fascinated by the Kashmir issue. The first generation still carries
the  memory  of  Partition’  and  ‘the  core  of  their  message  [talking  about  USINPAC in
particular] is very anti-Muslim’.9 When asked about their Muslim membership, USINPAC
leaders seem embarrassed as they did not know the figure. In the end, they come up with
a 10-15% estimate, a proportion that corresponds to the general proportion of Muslims in
India  and  they  think  would  hence  enhance  their  representativity.  They  could  not
however  mention one  active  Muslim member  and none of  them was  Muslim either.
Moreover, none of the 125 private donations made to USINPAC, since its creation, was
registered in a Muslim name.10 The USINPAC members I met said they wish to defend
India’s positions, oppose Pakistan and told traumatic tales of Islamic fundamentalism.
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Although a few of them directly experienced Partition, they all seemed to carry its stigma
and have an Indo-centric approach, by contrast with the younger America-bred activists
who focused on South Asian cooperation and local community issues. The generation gap,
aggravated by the fact that only 22.7% of Indian Americans were born in the U.S., all in
the younger age group of course,  provides a potent explanation about the pervading
defiance against Islam encountered in USINPAC and other leading organizations.  This
observation suggests that the former generation of Indian American activists is more
prone to  long-distance  nationalism,  and generally  to  what  has  been termed ‘Yankee
hindtuva’ than the younger lobbyists (Mathew & Prashad 2000). But it can be argued that
the  American political  system provided a  safe  haven for  this  long-distance  religious
nationalism
 
Ethnicity and religion in the American context
9 Since the end of the Cold War, American policy-makers have been paying unprecedented
attention to ethnic minorities and diasporas in the US territory. In December 2000, a
report entitled Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts
and commissioned by the CIA emphasized this point by stating that ‘increasing migration
will create influential diasporas, affecting policies, politics and even national identity in
many countries’ and that ‘US foreign priorities will be more transnational’.11 It is not
surprising in this context that the Non Resident Indians and People of Indian Origins in
the  US  wished  to  organize  themselves  into  a  lobby  and  that  control  over  identity
definition became a crucial issue.  Actually,  the ethnic dimension of American foreign
policy  is  not  a  new phenomenon and Yossi  Shain dates  ethnic  lobbying back to  the
beginning of  Irish immigration after  the 1840 famine,  while  others view 1908 as  the
landmark for lobbying in the United States (Shain 1999: 12, Mohammad-Arif 2000).12 But,
this phenomenon acquired a new momentum after the 1960s and especially after the end
of the Cold War, which was regarded as a ‘catalyst’ (Ambrosio 2002). In 1975, more than
fifteen years before the fall of the USSR, Glazer and Moynihan had already identified this
growing trend in American politics when they wrote that ‘the ethnic composition is the
single most  important  determinant of  American foreign history’  (Glazer & Moynihan
1975: 23-24). The abrogation of previous anti-lobbyist regulations in 1976 through the
adoption  of  the  Muskie-Conable  Bill,  which  enabled  registered  charities  to  devote  1
million dollars every year to political lobbying activities, enabled many affluent groups,
including ethnic minorities, to enter the political game (Abélès 2002: 107) and since then
this  phenomenon  amplified.  Indeed,  in  the  past  twenty  years,  multiculturalism  has
encouraged the creation of new ethnic lobbies that have contributed to the conflation of
domestic and international issues in America (Ambrosio 2002: 10).13
10 Ethnic lobbies in the U.S. have been widely criticized for introducing external concerns in
American domestic politics. Some scholars, like Tony Smith for example, are extremely
critical of these groups which are regarded as a foreign hand (Smith 2000). Others, like
Yossi  Shain,  have  emphasized  their  positive  contribution  to  the  introduction  of
democracy and of American values in their countries of origin as they have to adopt the
dominant American ideology. Some ethnic lobbyists, worried about accusations of dual
allegiance, will even go as far as to deny any sympathies abroad. The Senior Legislative
Counsel of USINPAC insists for example that ‘we’re American first. For us, the important
issues are domestic issues that have nothing to do with India (…) we do not raise money
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from India and do not advocate for India’, a statement in sharp contrast with USINPAC’s
professed mission of bettering the U.S.-India relationship and defending India’s views in
the U.S. In any case, whether ethnic lobbies are their home countries’ ambassadors or
only  domestic  actors  spreading  American  values  worldwide,  both  parties  agree  that
ethnic lobbies can be of interest for their home countries as they (sometimes but not
always) endorse the views of their home country governments. However much they wish
to  appear  embedded  in  the  American  concern,  they  also  ‘often  see  themselves  as
representatives of their old country abroad’. In short, they have to accommodate both the
American system in which they function and the homeland they wish to defend. After the
fall of communism and especially under the Republican administration after the 9/11
attacks, Islam and the values of its most extremist representatives have been constructed
as the new enemy of America (Shain 1999:  40).  For the Indian American community,
endorsing such a view, whether explicitly or implicitly meant acceptance in the American
mainstream,  while  the  secular  and  multi-confessional  nature  of  their  home-country
demanded a softer approach of  Islam. Indeed,  the presentation of  the Muslim as the
absolute Other is at odds with the values of the Indian Constitution and the unease of
many Indian American lobbyists about Islam can bee rooted down to this fundamental
tension, inherent to the American system.
11 Eventually, another factor has led to an anti-Muslim sentiment amongst the Indian ethnic
lobby.  Indeed,  the  American  political  system  favours  ethno-religious  definitions  of
identity and religious affiliation. The hostility between the South Asian Muslim and the
Hindu communities in the U.S. are generally seen as the backlash of communal tension in
India. Unrest in the diaspora after the demolition of Babri Masjid in Ayodhya seemed to
confirm this analysis. However, work conducted in South California, where an important
number of Indian Americans reside, by Prema Kurien has emphasized the local nature of
this  animosity.  According  to  her,  the  American system implicitly  favours  a  religious
definition of identity and which in this particular case influences the construction of
‘Indianness’ along religious lines (Kurien 1997: 2).14 This context enabled hindutva,  the
extremist  Hindu nationalist  ideology instigated by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS) and its subsidiaries, to become the dominant ideology behind Hindu associations in
the U.S, who gave voice to the idea of India as a Hindu Rashtra (a Hindu state). At the same
time, Muslim Indians differentiated themselves by defending the secular nature of the
Indian state and heralding the values of tolerance propelled by the Indian Constitution.
The Indian American lobby in Washington does not endorse the Hindu-Muslim cleavage
and should therefore be devoid of this religious dimension. Most groups do not indeed
demonize Indian Muslims as it would fragilize their ambitions to speak for the entire
community and choose instead to target Pakistan in particular or Islamism at large. The
religious  polarity  in  the  wider  community  and  the  presence  of  a  Hindu  nationalist
government  in  India  (from  1998  to  2004)  during  the  formative  years  of  this  lobby
contributed to its anti-Muslim undercurrents. A third element reinforced this tendency:
the Indo-Jewish alliance in the United States and the presence of long-distant nationalists
in the two communities.
 
Islamophobia and transnational mobilization
12 As Western host-countries realized that an ever increasing number of foreign refugees or
migrants  come  to  their  shores,  ethnicity  gradually  became  a  fundamental  factor  in
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differentiating between migrant communities and allocating national resources, through
positive discrimination for example.  Nathan Glazer and Daniel  Patrick Moynihan had
already noted it in 1975. Critics and protectionists still currently fear that these migrants
bring with them the ethnic strife that often rendered life in their home country difficult.
This fear is supported by evidence of communal conflict imported from the homeland
(Sheffer 2003: 201). To some extent, the India-Pakistan hostility and the Hindu-Muslim
cleavages  among South  Asian  Americans  illustrate  this.  It  stems  from the  nature  of
migration and from long-distance nationalism fostered by the experience of uprooting.
 
Long-distance nationalism
13 Many theorists of nationalism have observed the ‘internationalization of nationalism’ to
borrow A. D. Smith’s description (Smith 1999: 98). Ernest Gellner for instance devoted a
chapter of his book Nations and Nationalism to ‘the nationalism of diaspora’,  which he
identifies  as  ‘the third variant of  nationalism’  concerning a minority group,  whether
ethnic or not, in a host country (Gellner 1989).  But Benedict Anderson’s definition of
long-distance nationalism really constitutes a landmark in theoretical thinking. He uses
this concept as a counter-argument to the idea that the rise of transnational groups had
made  nationalism obsolete  (Anderson 1992:  4).  On  the  contrary,  he  argues  that  this
peculiar kind of nationalism breeds upon migration, mass communication and ethnicity:
The vast migrations produced over the past 150 years by the market, as well as war
and  political  oppression,  have  profoundly  disrupted  a  once  seemingly  ‘natural’
coincidence  of  national  sentiment  with  lifelong  residence  in  fatherland  or
motherland.  In  this  process  ‘ethnicities’  have  been  engendered  which  follow
nationalisms in complex and often explosive ways (…). It may well be that we are
faced here with a new type of nationalist: the ‘long-distance nationalist’ one might
perhaps  call  him.  For  while  mechanically  a  citizen  of  the  state  in  which  he
comfortably lives, but to which he may feel little attachment, he finds it tempting
to play identity politics by participating (via propaganda, money, weapons, any way
but voting) in the conflicts of his imagined Heimat—now only fax-time away. But
these citizenshipless participation is inevitably non-responsible—our hero will not
have to answer for, or pay the price of, the long-distance politics he undertakes. He
is also easy prey for shrewd political manipulators in his Heimat (Anderson 1992:
10, emphasis added)
14 In the last twenty years, South Asian communities in diaspora have been particularly
prone to long-distance nationalism and one can easily recall the Sikh diaspora’s support
to the Khalistani project and the Tamil diaspora’s support to the LTTE rebellion. In a way,
the Ghadar Party partook of the same logic. Several factors contribute to the assumption
that the first generation of Indian Americans, who became involved in politics in the
1980s and 1990s, do so as long-distance nationalists and tenets of foreign hindutva, either
because of the psychological trauma caused by migration or by the necessity to define
themselves in migration by opposition with an essentialized Other. Ashis Nandy favours
the first explanation and links long-distance nationalism amonsgt NRIs and PIOs to the
insecuriy  resulting  from  uprootedness,  cultural  alienation  and  a  minority  position.
Endorsing the cause of India and identifying with Hindu nationalism for instance and its
demonization of Islam could then be interpreted as ‘a symbolic redress of cultural defeat’
(Nandy 2000: 127-50, 164-170) and ‘compensatory gratification’ (Rajagopal 2001: 47). Most
specialists  of  diasporas  or  of  Indian  Americans  in  particular,  like  Walker  Conner,
Paramatama  Saran,  Philip  J.  Leonhard-Spark  and  Monisha  Das  Gupta,  follow  this
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psychological explanation and emphasize the migrant’s emotional need for a national
sentiment (Conner 1986: 16, Saran & Eames 1980: 170, Das Gupta 1997). 
15 However, post-1965 Indian migrants to the U.S. have now secured a comfortable position
in the American middle to upper class and are widely acknowledged as a successful and
hardworking group. Many of them have sought to assimilate in the American mainstream
and  have  acquired  U.S  citizenship.  Their  defiance  towards  Islam  and  their  leaning
towards the Sangh Parivar and its overseas network cannot therefore be attributed solely
to  an  emotional  instability.  According  to  Frederic  Barth’s  interactionist  theory  of
‘ethnicity boundaries’, developed in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of
Cultural  Difference,  an  ethnic  group  is  not  primarily  defined  by  its  primordial
characteristics but by what differentiates it from other groups. Differences with other
social groups matter more than similarities among the members of an ethnicity and the
identification of an Other serves as an identity marker (Barth 1969). Hindutva, with its
distancing of the Muslim community as foreign invaders, provided a potent ideology for
Indian Americans  in  search of  a  separate  identity  since  the  late  1970s.  Indeed,  they
lobbied for  the creation of  a  separate entry in the Census and were listed as  ‘Asian
Indians’ for the first time in 1980, before being officially labeled ‘Indian Americans’ in the
1990s  (Sabbagh  2003).  Moreover  the  constitution  of  the  Indian  American  lobbies
coincided with the rise of hindutva in India. The frequent visits of Indian dignitaries in the
U.S. and the rapid rise of the instrumentalization of the Internet towards this end, with
the creation of websites like www.hinduunity.org,  a pro-hindutva and Muslim-bashing
umbrella site based in Queens and Long Island, further fuelled ‘Yankee hindutva’. 
16 The  scandal  about  the  funds  of  the  India  Development  and  Relief  Fund  (IDRF)  in
September 2003 brought to light  the Sangh Parivar’s  international  networks and the
participation  of  the  Indian  diaspora,  and  mostly  of  Indian  Americans,  in  the  Hindu
nationalist project. Indeed, a report showed with ample evidence that the IDRF, a tax-
exempt charity based in Maryland, had channelled money to projects headed by the RSS
or its subsidiaries in India.15 While many donors, whether individuals or corporate had
unwittingly participated in this extremist project, the IDRF scandal however revealed the
extent of pro-hindutva sympathies among Indian Americans. After all, the Vishwa Hindu
Parishad (Hindu World Council, the religious branch of the Sangh Parivar) had opened its
branch in the U.S. in as early as 1970, while the IDRF had been created in 1989 two years
before the Overseas Friends of the Bharatiya Janata Party (OBJP). In the 1990s, Sangh
subsidiaries flourished on American university campuses and numerous websites based in
America broadcasted the hindutva ideology. Of course, the younger generation of ABCD
(American-Born Confused Desis)  has been particularly targeted by nationalist  student
organizations  who adopted  a  very  didactic  approach with  summer  camps  and Hindi
classes for beginners, while ‘many of the uncles and aunties belong or have sympathies
for the OBJP’ as remarked the President of IALI, who wished to differentiate himself from
long-distance  nationalism.  Anyhow,  the  fact  that  the  Legislative  Assistants  of
Congressman Joseph Crowley and Congressman Joe Wilson (the two co-chairs of the India
Caucus)  never  mention  and  never  work  with  Indian  Muslims,  while  they  maintain
frequent contacts with the Indian American lobbies, further hints at the penetration of a
largely Hindu-bias in the Indian American political representation. However, the fear of
the Muslim projected as the irredeemable Other could not have crept into the rhetoric of
leading Indian American lobbyists had it not been supported by the American system,
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which  increasingly  considers  ethno-religious  affiliations  as  potent  modes  of  political
representations.
 
From Kashmir to Palestine: the Indo-Jewish nexus 
17 It was only natural for the Indian American lobby to look at the Jewish lobby for guidance
as a model of political action. Indian Americans wished to emulate the strength of the
American Jewish lobby and Kumar P. Barve, the first Indian American holding office since
Dalip Singh Saund’s election to the Congress 1956, sums this interest up by stating that
‘Indian Americans see the American Jewish community as a yardstick against which to
compare  themselves.  It’s  seen  as  a  gold  standard  in  terms  of  political  activism.’16
However, in spite of the Jewish lobby’s position as the most prominent ethnic lobby in the
U.S.,  this  rapprochement is  a  recent phenomenon very much linked to long-distance
nationalism in the two communities and to the rise of hindutva in India.
18 The Sangh Parivar itself encouraged such an alliance and hoped it would become an anti-
Muslim front. According to Vijay Prashad, a leftist academic settled in the U.S., the Indo-
Jewish friendship in America is very much linked to the rise of right-wing nationalists,
personified by Sharon and Advani, in Israel and in India. He attributes it to the ‘Global
Right’ and to ‘the entente between India and Israel, between Hindutva and Sharonism in
the shadow of  US imperialism’  (Prashad 2003:  4-5,  7).  Of  course,  K.B.  Hedgewar,  the
founding father of the RSS, and Veer Savarkar, the author of the 1923 pamphlet Hindutva.
Who is a Hindu?, professed their admiration for Nazism and Fascism and wished to import
the idea of a Final Solution to the Muslim Indian community. However, the Sangh Parivar
soon distanced itself  with this  embarrassing position and sought  on the contrary to
embrace  the  Jewish  community,  seen  as  a  model  of  financial  strength  and  nation-
building.  The New Jew,  a strong and young man,  fighting for an independent nation
surrounded  by  hostile  Muslim  countries  was  an  attractive  image  for  the  Sangh,  an
organization aspiring at the moral, physical and religious rejuvenation of a Hindu India.
Besides,  the Palestinian-Israeli  conflict and Palestinian terrorism provided a tempting
parallel for the Hindu-Muslim communal tension and Kashmiri militancy in the eyes of
Sangh activists. Many BJP and Bajrang Dal leaders have thus spoken highly of Jews and
Israel. The Indo-Israel friendship was subsequently supported by the BJP government.
This new friendship was of course encouraged by the Indian government seeking to ally
itself  with Israel,  for strategic and military purposes.  An influential  Jewish American
defense lobbyist and the director of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA) works frequently with the Indian American community and was one of the first
professional lobbyist to be interested in India. He recalls his first visit there in 1997 and
says that ‘General J.  F.  R Jacob [an Indian Jewish general famous for his victory over
Pakistani forces in the 1971 war and for having been the BJP’s security adviser] hosted a
party  at  his  house,  where  we met BJP  officials  including  Jaswant  Singh [Minister  of
External Affairs and then of Finance during the second term of the BJP]. Here the State
Department only said ‘Congress’ and the Congress said that the BJP were extremists. But
Jacob said they were important and had a chance in the elections. They actually helped
increase the relationship with Israel (…) Also, Madhav (Monu) Nalapat [an academic who
has been directly involved in the India-China and the India-Us-Israel talks] helped. He is
Muslim but he is also a friend of Murli Manohar Joshi [a prominent BJP and RSS leader].’17
The involvement of the BJP in India and of the Sangh Parivar abroad in the Indo-Jewish
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diasporic friendship led to the creation of what was perceived as an anti-Muslim front in
the U.S. 
19 The Internet proved to be a potent instrument of long-distance nationalism, which, as
Benedict Anderson pointed out, feeds upon mass communications. In June 2001, the New
York Times journalist  Dean E.  Murphy could therefore write that ‘Two Unlikely Allies
Come  Together  in  Fight  Against  Muslims’.  Indeed,  the  site  www.hinduunity.org was
supported by the extremist U.S. followers of the late Rabbi David Kahane, who wanted to
throw the Arabs out of Israel (Prashad 2003: 73).18 When the website of the Bajrang Dal
featuring a  hitlist  was  closed down by the  American authorities,  the  Hatvika  Jewish
Identity Center came to its rescue and put it back on the Internet. Now that it is back
online,  the  pro-hindutva website  has  posted  links  to  several  extremist  Jewish
organizations under the subtitle ‘Israel Forever’. Recently another Hindu nationalist site
posted by an Indian resident and entitled Israel Storm (this site no longer exists) exposed
Muslim atrocities in Israel and Kashmir and extolled Indian citizens to elect anti-Muslim
leaders.19 Indeed, this alliance thrives on Islamophobia as a linking factor between the
two communities and the hindtuva sites often compare Kashmir to Palestine. For instance,
Rohit Vyasmaan, an activist involved in maintaining the Hindu Unity website, was quoted
in the New York Times saying ‘We are fighting the same war (…) Whether you call them
Palestinians, Afghans or Pakistanis, the root of the problem for Hindus and Jews is Islam’.
20 Moreover, the hindutva ideology rose in India at the time when the Indian American
lobbies were getting organized and certainly permeated its way through its opinion about
Islam. All the more so that the BJP government encouraged the Indo-Jewish official and
diasporic entente.
20 The  9/11  attacks  provided  another  pretext  for  the  reactivation  of  long-distance
nationalism in Indian American lobbies and for anti-Muslim ravings. Not surprisingly, the
Kashmir-Palestinian parallel is being invoked again, in a way reminiscent of the hindutva
websites,  while  the  Internet  is  acknowledged  as  a  political  media.  The  following
conversation among USINPAC members exemplifies this anti-Muslim hindutva penchant: 
Senor Legislative Counsel (SLC): ‘I  joined USINPAC because I was blown away by
9/11. I could have been there. After that, I saw the US-India relationship from the
point of view of strategic affairs and defence issue. But I have no personal gains in
this.  A unique perspective and voice that  has to be brought to bear.  My father
worked at 33, Liberty Plaza and I had so many meetings at the World Trade Center.
It changed everything for me. I knew people in the Pentagon who could have died.’ 
Director  Media and Communications (DMC):  ‘I  know five people  who had really
close calls. And one of my close friends suffered severe burns.’
SLC: ‘The World Trade Center is where we used to hang out, there was a Barnes &
Nobles  and  we  spent  a  lot  of  time  there.  There  are  many  people  like  that  at
USINPAC.  For  this  reason,  terrorism  is  one  of  our  highest  issues,  even  for  the
second generation.’
DMC: ‘I am a Gujarati from Bombay and I came to the US nine years ago. Because of
all this, NRIs, Indians and PIOs are scared to travel. There are jihadi websites that
target us. It’s impossible to go anywhere!’
SLC: ‘At the same time, India-Israel ties made sense after 9/11. After that, we see the
connections. They (the terrorists) got to work together!’
DMC: ‘I have a friend who did a PhD in Israel, at the Wiseman Institute. There are
actually many Indians in Israel.’
SLC: ‘Sanjay’s [Sanjay Puri, the director and founder of USINPAC] family came from
Lahore originally but they were thrown out during Partition. Half of his family died.
It was a bloodbath. They finally settled in Ahmedabad. With 9/11, the same thing
happened here. His personal bond with the AJC [American Jewish Committee] and
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AIPAC  [American  Israel  Public  Affairs  Committee]  is  because  of  that.  He  really
reached  out  to  create  a  coalition  for  that  one  issue  -  terrorism.  Hence  the
importance of educating people of this issue. One of the reasons USINPAC came
together is because of 9/11 not because it is an instrument for their members’ ego
or agenda. They joined out of fear and helplessness.’
Intern: ‘For the second generation, that (…) 9/11 (…) created a link between the
World Trade Center and Kashmir. It’s the same kind of people who did it, the same
kind of ideology.’
21 These three interviewees belong to different generations of Indian Americans and have a
very  different  degree  of  familiarity  with  the  lobbying  game.  The  Senior  Legislative
Counsel of USINPAC is a middle-aged professional lobbyist, while the Director of Media
and Communications is a younger civil  servant with less experience and the intern a
twenty-something graduate belonging to the second generation of  Indian Americans.
None of them have been directly exposed to Islamic terrorism and yet they link Partition,
friendship with the Jewish lobby, the 9/11 attacks and the Kashmiri insurgency to Islamic
terrorism,  which  henceforth  becomes  the  absolute  evil  against  which  different
communities have to unite. President Bush’s idea of an ‘axis of evil’ once again gave some
legitimacy to this analogical thinking three years after the 9/11 attacks. Thus fighting
terrorism, more than working for development, has become the core issue for the vast
majority of Indian American lobbies. Even AAPI has turned to terrorism as one of its main
concerns and addressed it along with healthcare issues, philanthropy and the India-U.S.
relationship at its 20th annual convention held in Chicago in June 2002. A report prepared
by AAPI in March 2002 and entitled India-U.S. Relations in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001,
also put Kashmir and Palestine at the same level as instances of communal conflict with
remarks such as ‘the thinking goes that if U.S. can bomb Afghanistan, Israel can bomb
Palestinian hideouts,  why can’t  India  bomb the terrorist  camps in Pakistan occupied
Kashmir or in Pakistan!’.21 The Kashmir-Palestinian equivalence is certainly not derived
from an official Indian position. On the contrary, the similarity between the two regions
is being used by the Muslim Hurriyat Conference to pressurize the Indian government to
evacuate Kashmir in the way Israel evacuated Gaza.22 The parallel between Palestine and
Kashmir  is  therefore  not  essentially  anti-Muslim  and  can  on  the  contrary  be
instrumentalized to further the Muslim Kashmiri cause. The Islamophobia among Indian
Americans, their focus on terrorism and their conflation of Palestine and Kashmir has to
be understood as a by-product of the American dominant political rhetoric and of Jewish
and Hindu long-distance nationalisms. 
 
Conclusion
22  Several questions arise from the observation that the Indian American lobbies have a
tendency to identify Islam as the irredeemable Other. To begin with, what is the influence
of  this  hostility  on  inter-communal  relations  in  the  U.S.?  Moreover,  do  the  Indian
American lobbies really influence the American foreign policy towards Muslim countries
and Pakistan in particular? The answers to both interrogations go beyond the scope of
this article. However, the Indo-Jewish nexus in Washington, the Congressional Caucus on
India and the Indian Americans do target Pakistan as a primary concern of U.S. foreign
policy.  This  anti-Muslim  streak  has  also  permeated  the  political  position  of  many
Congressmen, who tend to lump together Israel and India’s concerns. The space devoted
to the Indian American lobby in the press tends to give it  undue importance in the
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process of political decision-making. Of course, the actual power of this lobby needs to be
carefully  accessed but  measuring  influence  is  an  elusive  task.  Islamophobia  amongst
Indian American lobbyists indicates that they try to gain influence by aligning themselves
with what they perceive as the mainstream American discourse. On the other hand, one
can wonder if this strategy will prove fruitful in a country that is increasingly critical of
overly sectarian positions. Indeed, the recent sales of F-16 planes to Pakistan and the
Pakistan-U.S. friendship since 2001 clearly indicate the limited influence of the Indian
American  Islamophobia  and  the  Indian  American  lobbies.  Eventually,  the  Indian
American lobbies in Washington and the pro-hindutva expatriates tell only one side of the
Indian diaspora story in the U.S. There are many groups and publications, like Promise of
India or  Samar,  which are  fighting  communalism.  The  recent  scandal  about  the
controversial  Indian  Chief  Minister  Narendra  Modi  reveals  the  oppositions  and  the
diversity  of  the  Indian  American  community.  Narendra  Modi,  often  exposed  as  the
instigator of the 2002 anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat, had been denied his visa to the
U.S. where he had been invited by the AAHOA-New York. The American authorities had
refused the India official the right to set foot on its territory thanks to the action taken by
several  groups,  including  Indian  Americans  fighting  for  secularism.  A  three-fold
conclusion can be drawn from this  episode:  firstly,  Islamophobia is  far  from being a
consensual  view  among  Indian  Americans,  secondly  academically-oriented  secular
activists both on the West and on the East coast can sometimes counter the work of New
York or Washington-based ethnic lobbies, and finally the idea of India is still  fiercely
debated among the diaspora. 
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the case for 79% of Americans. Besides the median income among Indian American families is
more than 20 000$ higher than the median income in non-Hispanic White families. 
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indassc.htm#Arkansas. The total number of association is however supposedly much higher and
this listing only mentions associations using the electronic media.
4. According to a directory published in 1979, there were 200 Indian American associations in the
country. 
5. From the home page of USINPAC: http://www.usinpac.com.
6. Senior Fellow – International Affairs & Indian-Jewish American Relations, interview with the
author, 6 August 2004, Washington.
7. Legislative affairs counsel of USINPAC, interview with the author, 10 August 2004, Washington.
8. Executive Director of the Indian American Center for Political Awareness (IACPA), interview
with the author, 9 August 2004, Washington.
9. President of South Asians for Kerry (SAKI), interview with the author, 3 August 2004, New
York.
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127p.
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16. Alan Cooperman, ‘India, Israel Interests Team Up’, The Washington Post, 19 July 2003, http://
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outlet: http://www.hvk.org
17. Director  of  the  Jewish  Institute  for  National  Security  Affairs  (JINSA),  interview with  the
author, 6 August 2004, Washington.
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that ‘This site was inspired by the www.masada2000.org website. Yes, truth hurts but that’s the
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20. Dean E. Murphy, op. cit.
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ABSTRACTS
In the past few years, the Indian American community has gained an unprecedented visibility in
the international arena. It is indeed often projected as a model community and now constitutes
growing  and  influential  ethnic  lobbies  in  Washington.  But,  in  the  face  of  its  sheer  division,
Islamophobia  did  provide  a  unifying  force  sometimes  bigger  than  the  interest  of  Indian
Americans or of their country of origin. Other factors can also be summoned. Among them, a
leniency of many post-1965 migrants towards Hindu nationalist ideology and the wish to align
with Jewish pressure groups in the context of the war against terrorism and to further the India-
Israel-US strategic partnership play a major role in explaining Islamophobic overtones in the
Indian American lobbies.
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